A Formal Model of Partitioning for Integrated Modular Avionics

The aviation industry is gradually moving toward the use of integrated modular avionics (IMA) for civilian transport aircraft. An important concern for IMA is ensuring that applications are safely partitioned so they cannot interfere with one another. We have investigated the problem of ensuring safe partitioning and logical non-interference among separate applications running on a shared Avionics Computer Resource (ACR). This research was performed in the context of ongoing standardization efforts, in particular, the work of RTCA committee SC-182, and the recently completed ARINC 653 application executive (APEX) interface standard. We have developed a formal model of partitioning suitable for evaluating the design of an ACR. The model draws from the mathematical modeling techniques developed by the computer security community. This report presents a formulation of partitioning requirements expressed first using conventional mathematical notation, then formalized using the language of SRI'S Prototype Verification System (PVS). The approach is demonstrated on three candidate designs, each an abstraction of features found in real systems.