Lessons Learned from the Space Shuttle Engine Hydrogen Flow Control Valve Poppet Breakage

The Main Propulsion System (MPS) uses three Flow Control Valves (FCV) to modulate the flow of pressurant hydrogen gas from the Space Shuttle Main Engines (SSME) to the hydrogen External Tank (ET). This maintains pressure in the ullage volume as the liquid level drops, preserving ET structural integrity and assuring the engines receive a sufficient amount of head pressure. On Space Transportation System (STS)-126 (2009), with only a handful of International Space Station (ISS) assembly flights from the end of the Shuttle program, a portion of a single FCV?s poppet head broke off at about a minute and a half after liftoff. The risk of the poppet head failure is that the increased flow area through the FCV could result in excessive gaseous hydrogen flow back to the external tank, which could result in overboard venting of hydrogen ullage pressure. If the hydrogen venting were to occur in first stage (i.e., lower atmosphere), a flammability hazard exists that could lead to catastrophic loss of crew and vehicle. Other failure risks included particle impact damage to MPS downstream hardware. Although the FCV design had been plagued by contamination-related sluggish valve response problems prior to a redesign at STS-80 (1996), contamination was ruled out as the cause of the STS-126 failure. Employing a combination of enhanced hardware inspection and a better understanding of the consequences of a poppet failure, safe flight rationale for subsequent flights (STS-119 and later) was achieved. This paper deals with the technical lessons learned during the investigation and mitigation of this problem at a time when assembly flights were each in the critical path to Space Station success.