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Space Program Advocacy Can Distort Project Management and Damage Systems EngineeringOver-optimistic project advocacy often causes exaggerated performance claims and underestimated costs and schedules. This can distort project management and damage systems engineering. NASA projects such as the space shuttle and Hubble are extreme examples. NASA's spectacular success in the Apollo moon landings seems to have produced overconfidence and carelessness, but also to have gained tolerance for unrealistic claims and forgiveness when they were proven wrong. Apollo risk analysis predicted many astronaut fatalities. This was believed but was potentially damaging to the Apollo program, so risk analysis was discontinued. The moon landings beat bad odds because Apollo obsessively reduced risk. Its success seemed to confirm that risk analysis was unreasonably pessimistic and that risk could be overcome by good engineering. This understanding caused risk to be increased during space shuttle engineering and led to an unnecessarily dangerous approach. The shuttle design placed a fragile spacecraft next to the fuel tanks and failed to provide crew escape or launch abort. These design decisions directly caused the Challenger and Columbia tragedies. After Challenger, risk analysis was re-established. The current rocket and capsule design does consider risk and the result strongly resembles Apollo. Apollo advocacy led NASA to abandon risk analysis and this was ultimate cause of the Shuttle tragedies. Excessive advocacy that distorts risk, cost, and schedule could be prevented in an ideal organization that used systems engineering to make rational and fair decisions. However, most real organizations accommodate human and group needs using informal methods often described as "the system." Humans have biases, use innate decision making heuristics, instinctively rely on "gut feel," and establish deviant groups through groupthink. Expecting organizations to become totally rational is impractical, but specific problems such as neglecting risk and underestimating cost and schedule can be directly challenged with some hope of success.
Document ID
20190033137
Acquisition Source
Ames Research Center
Document Type
Conference Paper
Authors
Jones, Harry W.
(NASA Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA, United States)
Date Acquired
November 21, 2019
Publication Date
October 21, 2019
Subject Category
Law, Political Science And Space Policy
Report/Patent Number
ARC-E-DAA-TN74103
Meeting Information
Meeting: International Astronautical Congress (IAC) 2019
Location: Washington, D. C.
Country: United States
Start Date: October 21, 2019
End Date: October 25, 2019
Sponsors: International Astronautical Federation (IAF-HQ)
Distribution Limits
Public
Copyright
Work of the US Gov. Public Use Permitted.
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