report of the presidential commission on the space shuttle challenger accident, volume 1

The findings of the Commission regarding the circumstances surrounding the Challenger accident are reported and recommendations for corrective action are outlined. All available mission data, subsequent tests, and wreckage analyses were reviewed and specific failure scenarios were developed. The Commission concluded that the cause of the Mission 51-L accident was the failure of the pressure seal in the aft field joint of the right solid rocket motor. The failure was due to a faulty design unacceptably sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of temperature, physical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reuse, processing, and the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading. In addition to analyzing the material causes of the accident, the Commission examined the chain of decisions that culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that the decision making process was flawed in several ways including (1) failure in communication resulting in a launch decision based on incomplete and misleading information, (2) a conflict between engineering data and management judgements, and (3) a NASA management structure that permitted flight safety problems to bypass key Shuttle managers.